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## NFU Bad – De-alert

### NFU raises alert status

Beach – Master General of the Ordnance, the British Army Board – ‘2

Hugh, Implementation of No First Use of Nuclear Weapons Strategy/Agreements from Pugwash Meeting no. 279 "No First Use of Nuclear Weapons" London, UK, 15-17 November 2002, http://www.pugwash.org/reports/nw/hughbeach.htm

The other obvious way of setting oneself up for a NFU policy would be to adjust the status of one’s nuclear forces into a survivable second-strike mode. This might well involve increasing their numbers. It is no surprise that the nuclear weapons states at present professing a NFU policy are those that are actively increasing the size of their nuclear forces. American intelligence believes that the Chinese force of some 20 intercontinental missiles is to be tripled over the next decade or so. China will no doubt claim that this is being done in response to the American development of anti-ballistic missile defences. More probably China, despite the priority given to economic development, would have gone ahead with this expansion anyway. India also has plans to increase her nuclear missile force, perhaps putting them in submarines, a wholly logical implementation of a second-strike posture. Other possible responses are to disperse the missile sites, to go for mobile missiles or provide anti-ballistic missiles to defend them. (The ABM Treaty – now defunct – allowed for this. The US briefly possessed such a system and Russia still does). Another likely corollary of adopting a survivable second-strike posture would be to raise the alert status of nuclear forces. If the assumption is that these forces will be used at the time and place of a country’s own choosing then in normal circumstances a relatively relaxed posture can be adopted and the notice to fire reduced in a measured manner, when needed. If, on the other hand, nuclear weapons can be used only in retaliation for a nuclear strike on oneself then this is to give control of the timetable to the enemy. In logic a much shorter period of notice would have to be routinely observed and possibly authority to fire in the last resort permanently decentralised to individual missile force commanders. Worse still, such a country might feel compelled to adopt a policy of ‘launch on warning’ - the most unstable posture of all.

### Nuclear war

Blair, President of the World Security Institute, ‘9 (Bruce, February, “Toward True Security” www.ucsusa.org/global\_security/nuclear\_weapons/truesecurity.html)

The U.S. policy of maintaining the ability to launch its nuclear forces on warning is inherently dangerous because it also gives the United States the ability to launch its weapons quickly and without warning. Not only could this posture result in a mistaken U.S. launch, but—given the high accuracy and large number of deployed U.S. nuclear weapons—it also gives Russia an incentive to keep its forces on hair-trigger alert to protect its vulnerable nuclear missiles from a surprise U.S. attack. This, in turn, increases the very real risk of a mistaken, unauthorized, or accidental launch of Russian missiles. This is not just a hypothetical problem. In 1995, Russia’s early-warning system indicated a possible U.S. missile attack. Russia’s radars apparently could not rule out the possibility that a nearby rocket launch was a U.S. nuclear-armed missile fired from a submarine in the Norwegian Sea. This triggered Russia’s emergency nuclear decision process, and the alarm traveled all the way up the chain of command to President Boris Yeltsin, activating his nuclear suitcase, which would be used to authorize nuclear retaliation. About eight minutes into the rocket launch, the operators of Russia’s warning radars reported that the rocket did not threaten Russia, and the alarm was canceled.

## NFU Bad – Conventional Shift 1/3

### NFU key to conventional shift

Martin et al – Policy Analysis Program Officer, Stanley Foundation – ‘8

Matt, A New Look at No First Use, <http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=334>

Conference participants noted that there is a difference between declaratory policy and war plans, and that a doctrine of NFU would not necessarily change US nuclear weapons targeting policy. However, they also noted that declaratory policy helps shape the intellectual atmosphere in which US nuclear weapons policy is made. Military planners take declaratory policy into account, and its effects trickle down into procurement decisions, alert procedures, and operational war plans. A NFU policy would send a signal to American war planners that nuclear weapons are not appropriate in almost all contingencies. This would encourage them to develop capabilities and plans for using conventional arms to destroy hardened and deeply buried targets, biological weapons laboratories, and other sites that the current administration has suggested could only be destroyed by nuclear attack. Expanding conventional capabilities in turn reduces the likelihood that the United States would feel the need to use nuclear weapons. As one conference participant noted, “If you rule out the use of nuclear force, you push war planners to think with more discipline …You can’t just let military planners assume that it’s all right to use nuclear weapons to cover a wide range of targets.” Without the discipline imposed by a change in guidance doctrine, one participant said, military planners are prone to including nuclear options in war plans simply because they need a mission for weapons they already have.

NFU Bad – Conventional Shift 2/3

### Conventional ballistic missile deployment causes global missile and nuclear arms races and lowers the threshold for war

Andreasen Fmr. Director Defense Policy & Arms Control National Security Council ‘6

(Steve-, July/August, Arms Control Today, “Off Target? The Bush Administration's Plan to Arm Long-Range Ballistic Missiles with Conventional Warheads”, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_07-08/CoverStory?print>)

Since their initial deployment by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1950s, land- and sea-based long-range (greater than 5,500 kilometers) ballistic missiles have been uniquely associated with nuclear weapons. Over the past 50 years, a long-range ballistic missile has never been used in combat by any of the five states that now possess them: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Moreover, the United States has led an international campaign opposing the development, testing, and deployment of ballistic missiles by other states in every region of the globe, arguing that ballistic missiles, because of their short time to target and destructive force, provide a first-strike capability and are thus inherently destabilizing. In this context, the development, deployment, and potential use of long-range ballistic missiles as strategic conventional weapons raises a number of policy-related concerns and questions. Reciprocal Deployments Other states that now have long-range ballistic missiles, in particular Russia and China, could adopt our rationale and follow our lead. They could seek to develop the capability to strike with conventional long-range ballistic missiles their own set of “urgent targets,” adapting the notion of Prompt Global Strike to fit their own perceived national interest. Whether and how this might threaten U.S. security interests is somewhat of a question mark, although one can certainly envision scenarios where the risk of conflict involving long-range ballistic missiles would increase. New Deployments by States U.S. moves might also affect other states, which over the next decade or so may have the capability to develop, test, and deploy long-range ballistic missiles (e.g., India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan). They could publicly adopt our rationale for proceeding with “conventional” long-range ballistic missiles to fend off international pressure to restrict their own long-range missile programs. Yet, these missiles could and likely would, at least in the near term, serve as delivery platforms for nuclear weapons, given the challenge of developing an effective conventional capability. Thus, we could substantially undercut both our missile and nuclear nonproliferation policies by proceeding with the deployment of conventional long-range ballistic missiles. Lowering the Threshold for Use Deployment of conventional warheads on U.S. long-range ballistic missiles would be perceived by many as lowering the threshold for use of these weapons. Indeed, the public rationale for proceeding with conventional Trident missiles is to enhance the Pentagon’s ability to “pre-empt conventionally” and provide the president with an option to “respond quickly” with conventional arms.[2] Moreover, the deployment of conventional long-range ballistic missiles in Russia, China, and perhaps other states could happen soon after these states developed the necessary technology. It is difficult not to conclude that the probability of these weapons being used would increase, introducing a new and potentially destabilizing factor into the security calculations of a number of countries spread out over volatile regions of the globe.

NFU Bad – Conventional Shift 2/2

### That turns solvency

Manzo Researcher CDI ‘8 (Vince, An Examination of the Pentagon’s Prompt Global Strike Program: Rationale, Implementation, and Risks, Cetner for Defense Information, http://www.cdi.org/pdfs/PGSfactsheet.pdf)

Given that U.S. intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and SLBMs have previously only carried nuclear warheads, many analysts argue that other countries, such as Russia or China, might “misinterpret the launch of a conventionally-armed ballistic missile and conclude that they are under attack with nuclear weapons.”35 Although this concern has been expressed in context of both Navy and Air Force conventional missile programs, concern over the CTM program is more acute: “To outside observers, the [Trident] sub’s conventional and nuclear weapons would appear identical- the same size, the same speed, shooting from the same location. Ian Davis and Robin Dodd argue that the deployment of conventional ballistic missiles will inject an additional dose of uncertainty into any U.S. long-range missile launch. As a consequence, countries “targeted by any ICBM strike would need to treat any attack a nuclear one if they were to avoid being open to a successful surprise US nuclear first strike.”37 In other words, the United States could potentially exploit this capability by initiating a nuclear first strike under the guise of a conventional long-range missile launch. The implication of this argument is that deploying long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads will further complicate any efforts to reduce the readiness level of other states’ nuclear weapons, as they will feel that their arsenals are even more vulnerable to a U.S. first strike. Whether reducing the readiness level of nuclear weapon should be on the agenda in future arms control negotiations is a separate issue, but its omission from such should be the result of a conscious policy decision, not an unintended and unexamined consequence of a new weapon deployment.

## NFU Bad – Deterrence

### NFU now would weaken the credibility of security assurances

Martin et al – Policy Analysis Program Officer, Stanley Foundation – ‘9

Matt, A New Look at No First Use, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=334

One participant questioned whether adopting a NFU posture in the current political environment is wise. If the United States adopts NFU in 2009 in the midst of a withdrawal from Iraq, troubles in Afghanistan, and an economic crisis, it might contribute to a general perception that the United States is weakening and its assurances are less credible. The United States has been militarily aggressive since the 9/11 attacks but that does not mean our assurances are more credible. There is uncertainty about US nonproliferation policy and almost no trust in US intelligence. Elites abroad do not know what to believe when the United States makes statements about its intentions. While our goal of a NFU pledge would be to devalue nuclear weapons, discourage proliferation, and lock in US conventional superiority, other states might not interpret the move that way. A NFU pledge might simply signal that a weakened United States had lost its nerve.

### Nuclear deterrence solves war and terrorism

Record 2004 Jeffrey Policy analysis Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counter proliferation Jeffrey Senate Armed Services Committee July 8, 2004 http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf

During the Cold War, the principal function of nuclear weapons was to deter nuclear attack. Nuclear deterrence was not considered a tool of nonproliferation. The primary mechanisms for halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons were the nonproliferation regime established by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the U.S. extension of nuclear deterrence to states that might otherwise have sought security through the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Since the end of the Cold War, and especially in the wake of the September 11, 2001, al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. government has reexamined the utility of both nuclear deterrence and nonproliferation. The discovery in the wake of the 1991 Gulf War that Iraq, an NPT signatory, had secretly embarked on a huge nuclear weapons program prompted the United States to embrace counterproliferation,which consists of a series of nonwar initiatives designed to prevent hostile states from acquiring nuclear weapons and, in the event of crisis or war, to destroy such weapons and their supporting infrastructure. The 9/11 attacks a decade later spawned proclamation of a new use-of-force doctrine calling for preventive military action against so-called “rogue states” seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. The doctrine reflected a loss of confidence in traditional nuclear deterrence; rogue states, it was believed, were irrational and might launch attacks on the United States or transfer weapons of mass destruction to terrorist organizations. Thus the global war on terrorism, highlighted by the preventive war against Iraq, became as much a war of counterproliferation as it was a war on terrorism. The wisdom and necessity of preventive war as a substitute for nuclear deterrence are, however, highly questionable. The evidence strongly suggests that credible nuclear deterrence remains effective against rogue state use of WMD, if not against attacks by fanatical terrorist organizations; unlike terrorist groups, rogue states have critical assets that can be held hostage to the threat of devastating retaliation, and no rogue state has ever used WMD against an enemy capable of such retaliation. Additionally, preventive war is not only contrary to the traditions of American statecraft that have served U.S. security interests so well but also anathema to many longstanding friends and allies.

## A2: NFU Good – Prolif

### Declaratory policy doesn’t matter

Martin et al – Policy Analysis Program Officer, Stanley Foundation – ‘9 Matt, A New Look at No First Use, http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/resources.cfm?id=334

Some participants were not sure that NFU would measurably reduce the salience of nuclear weapons. For example, nuclear weapons certainly affect the relationship between India and Pakistan, and their nuclear weapons are not even deployed. Moreover, when Russia and India declared that they would no longer adhere to a NFU posture, the effect—negative or positive—on the international community was negligible. One participant recalled a meeting in Norway on reducing the salience of nuclear weapons, in which the representatives of Asian countries were unenthusiastic about NFU. Instead, they said the key to delegitimizing nuclear weapons was to get them out of the hands of the military and remove them from war plans. To that end, rather than changing declared doctrine, the United States should focus on programmatic steps toward a less aggressive nuclear posture—cutting the Reliable Replacement Warhead, de-alerting nuclear weapons, developing conventional means to cover every possible contingency except for nuclear attack, and so forth. The United States should strive to emphasize, with words and actions, that “the purpose of nuclear weapons is to ensure that they are never used.” Participants said that such a policy would have the virtue of reducing the salience of nuclear weapons while remaining more realistic and honest about possible nuclear use in extenuating circumstances.

### Nuclear threats solve prolif

Charles Glaser, Professor and Deputy Dean, Graduate School of Public Policy Studies at the University of Chicago, and Steve Fetter, Professor and Dean of the School of Public Policy University of Maryland – ‘5 Counterforce Revisited, International Security, Vol. 30, No. 2 (Fall 2005), pp. 84–126

There are also considerations that cut in the opposite direction. U.S. threats to use nuclear weapons against nuclear targets could decrease a state’s incentives to acquire nuclear weapons by making explicit that possessing them puts it on the U.S. nuclear target list. Moreover, if nuclear threats increase the adversary’s assessment that the United States would use nuclear weapons to destroy its nuclear capability, then these threats could reduce the value of acquiring nuclear weapons in the first place, by lowering the expectation that they would be available for deterrence.**6**1 These considerations by themselves are unlikely to convince a state to forgo nuclear weapons, but they push in that direction.

## A2: NFU Good – NPT

### NPT and norms don’t prevent proliferation

Lyon –Program Director, Strategy and International, Australian Strategic Policy Institute – ‘5 Rod, Nuclear weapons, international security and the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:4,425 — 430

Hanson and Wesley differ over whether the NPT offers an effective barrier to proliferation. There are three barriers to proliferation: gaining access to fissile material, achieving the level of technological skill the US had in 1945, and having a motive to seek nuclear weapons at all. The first is a formidable barrier, and might by itself be responsible for the relatively slow pace of horizontal proliferation. The second weakens every year, and the direct assistance for a civil nuclear program that NPT signatories can claim as members in good standing contributes to that weakening. The third barrier – motive –is a product of rational calculation, and not merely of normative pressures. So is the NPT effective? Well, it certainly helps to deter states who have little or no intention of building nuclear weapons from building them. But its problem is that it doesn’t seem to be effective in hard cases. It doesn’t stop proliferation by determined proliferators. The NPT suffers from the classic weakness of all arms control: it works best where needed least.

### NPT not key to norms

Wesley – PhD in IR , Research convenor of the Australian Institute of International Affairs, Director of the Griffith Asia Institute at Griffith University – ‘5

Michael, It's time to scrap the NPT, Australian Journal of International Affairs,59:3,283 — 299

A third concern is that by making it easier to acquire nuclear weapons, the end of the NPT will give certain disgruntled states the confidence to defy global and regional norms of behaviour. However, this concern assumes that such states only comply with such norms due to a persisting sense of insecurity that possession of nuclear weapons would remove. As Chayes and Chayes have convincingly argued, states follow norms and agreements in international relations not out of the fear of coercion but due to a general ‘propensity to comply’ with agreements they have made or joined (1998). Even disgruntled states exhibit great concern for their international reputation, especially in an era of globalisation, where general reputation and confidence in a government is necessary to secure the requirements for economic development. Colonel Muammar Ghaddafi’s extraordinary about-face in compensating the victims of Libyan-backed terrorist attacks and abandoning well-developed plans to develop a nuclear arsenal have only underlined the importance of reputation and co-operativeness in the age of globalisation.

## A2: NFU Good – Not Modeled

### NFU is incredible, not modeled, and will lead to a crisis situation

The Stanley Foundation 2008: A New Look at No First Use of Nuclear Weapons” August 8, 2008, http://www.maximsnews.com/news20080822stanleyfdtnnuclearfirststrikedoctrine10808221601.htm

The Drawbacks of No First Use Some participants argued that the United States should not adopt a NFU doctrine, because although the Soviet Union is no longer a threat, we cannot be sure what the future security environment will look like. One conference participant argued that a more sensible position would be a posture of “defensive last resort,” as proposed in a 1993 *Foreign Affairs* article by McGeorge Bundy, William Crowe, and Sidney Drell. That article argued: “In recognizing the possibility of a future case in which there might be justification for a use of nuclear weapons in a defensive last resort, we are simply resisting the notion that our country can be certain, *a priori*, that there will never be a case when such use might be the least bad choice.”  Some conference participants questioned whether there really was such uncertainty in the post-Cold War world. They argued that it was highly unlikely that “Stalin might come back” or that the United States would be faced with an overwhelming conventional threat that could only be offset with nuclear weapons. Indeed, pressed to describe specific scenarios that might require the first use of nuclear weapons, conference members initially could not think of any because the United States possesses overwhelming conventional superiority. Subsequently, they outlined a situation in which the US military, already fighting in two theaters (e.g., the Middle East and the Korean Peninsula), was faced with yet another major conflict. However, there was disagreement over the importance of this and similar scenarios, with some participants warning that an overabundance of caution—a fear of highly improbable scenarios—can lead to irrational policy. One participant countered that, were such a situation to arise, we could always revoke our NFU policy. However, that possibility immediate raised the problem of whether a NFU doctrine was credible because it could be so easily changed. Another participant noted that in a crisis situation, revocation of NFU would be seen as threatening and escalatory, much like mating warheads to missiles. Nevertheless, before we adopt a NFU posture, we must ask whether our conventional forces can fulfill the first-use role nuclear weapons have traditionally played. Most conference participants thought they could, given US power-projection capabilities. Moreover, given the extreme consequences of being the first to use nuclear weapons in a conflict, the United States is extremely unlikely to do so, even if there were some military advantage. But other participants worried that conventional weapons could not fulfill US security guarantees as well as nuclear weapons. A conventional guarantee is a promise to fight a war with an ally, on that ally’s territory; the United States and its ally would likely win the conflict, but the ally’s population and territory would suffer horribly. By contrast, a nuclear security guarantee presents a potential enemy with an existential threat to its territory and is therefore more likely to prevent war. During the Cold War, nuclear weapons deterred the Soviet Union from invading Germany because it was likely that nuclear retaliation would destroy the entire Soviet Union. A nonnuclear NATO would not have had the same deterrent effect. While that particular force imbalance was unique to the Cold War, conference participants noted that the United States does not have enough conventional power to deter a North Korean invasion of South Korea. In addition, the United States can only deploy overwhelming conventional power to certain locations because it relies heavily on air and sea forces, which have limited range. For example, US forces would be unable to fight their way to Tehran if that were needed.

## NFU Links to Politics

### Links to politics – Washington loves its nuclear deterrence

Butfoy 2009 Senior lecturer in international relations specialising in international security issues, Any Butfoy, September 29, 2009, “Obama versus the Pentagon” http://inside.org.au/obama-versus-the-pentagon

Clearly, some historical context is needed here. During the cold war Washington’s vision of world order was partly defined by nuclear weapons. Although there was an obvious need to deter the Soviet Union from using the bomb against American cities, the nuclearisation of US thinking went beyond this narrow view of deterrence. Other factors, which still resonate in Washington, affected nuclear policy. Most importantly, politics dictated the need for “extended deterrence”, which is jargon for the US nuclear umbrella covering alliances such as NATO. This involved more than the threat of nuclear retaliation to dissuade Moscow from using its nuclear forces; it also explicitly rested on the possible first-use of nuclear weapons to deter or defeat conventional attacks in Europe and Asia. Extended deterrence had other advantages for Washington as well. For example, it reduced pressures for nuclear proliferation in allied countries, especially West Germany and Japan: the more Washington reassured them they would be looked after, the less their need to develop their own deterrents. It was assumed this network of deterrence and reassurance injected stability into the international system. Another plus was that US control of the west’s nuclear button underlined its international leadership status; it was one of the things that made it a superpower.